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Risk: Mathematical and Otherwise 
 
John Adams 
University College London, England 
 
Abstract: What role might mathematicians have to play in the management of risk? The idea of turning a risk, 
a possibility of loss or injury, into a “calculated” risk, a quantified probability of loss or injury, is one that has 
obvious appeal not just to statisticians and mathematicians – but to large numbers of others who would like to 
know the probability of failure before pursuing some intended course of action. Conclusion: even when risks 
can be calculated with great precision, they can only be used to inform judgment, but not substitute for it. And 
it matters who is making the judgment. 
Keywords: risk compensation, virtual risk, probability, risk amplification. 
 
 
[Thanks to Mark Anderson for permission to reproduce] 
In 1999 NASA’s Mars Climate Orbiter burned and crashed because no one had thought to 
check whether force, expressed in pounds, had been converted to force expressed in Newtons 
(Grossman, 2010). Failure to carry the one, or convert pounds to Newtons, are examples of only one 
of the risks encountered in attempting to apply mathematics to the management of risk.  
Assuming they can remember to carry the one, what role might mathematicians have to play 
in the management of risk? The idea of turning a risk, a possibility of loss or injury, into a 
“calculated” risk, a quantified probability of loss or injury, is one that has obvious appeal not just to 
statisticians and mathematicians – but to large numbers of others who would like to know the 
probability of failure before pursuing some intended course of action. 
“Risk” (almost a billion Google hits) has become a booming business. “Risk management” 
yields over 80 million hits, and “chief risk officer” (of interest to those looking for employment in 
this field) returns half a million. Governments are keen on risk management: Turnbull, Basel, 
Sarbanes-Oxley are names associated with guidance, accords or legislative acts intended to ensure 
that financial risks are managed effectively. Most big banks now have extraordinarily highly paid 
chief risk officers (CROs) to ensure compliance with their requirements – in 2011 the CRO at Bank 
of America was paid $11.4 million (Bloomberg News, 2011). Other large, non-financial, enterprises 
such as General Motors and Ford, Shell and BP, Delta Airlines, Toyota, also have senior executives 
bearing the CRO title. 
Adams 
	  
The financial meltdown of 2007/2008 gave a huge boost to the risk management industry. It 
has now declared itself a profession and it is growing at an impressive rate: GARP, the Global 
Association of Risk Professionals grew more than three-fold from 55,000 members pre-crash in 2006 
to more than 175,000 by 2011. 
 
Types of Risk 
The growing army of risk managers seeks to manage an extraordinary range of different 
risks. Here is a short starter list: financial risk (credit risk, market risk, liquidity risk, value at risk 
…), legal risk, reputation risk, medical risk, strategic risk, policy risks, inflation risk, recession risk, 
terrorism risk, sanctions risk, climate risk, radiation risk, extreme weather risk, road accident risk, 
etc., etc. 
The list could go on almost without end. Any threat of nature or any human activity, physical 
or intellectual, leading to an uncertain outcome can serve as a descriptor of a type of risk. 
A further, less open-ended, set of categories can be helpful in an attempt to illuminate the 
challenges facing risk managers seeking to reduce risks to calculable probabilities. Figure 1 presents 
a risk typology that is germane to most discussions of a wide variety of risks and their management. 
 
Figure 1. Different kinds of risk 
The Venn diagram in Figure 1 suggests that the typology can be useful to distinguish three 
different, but not mutually exclusive, types of risk. One need sample only a tiny fraction of the 100s 
of millions of Google “risk” hits to discover unnecessary and often acrimonious arguments caused by 
people using the same word to refer to different things and shouting past each other. The typology 
offered in Figure 1 can help to dispose of some unnecessary arguments and, perhaps, civilize others.  
Risks in the perceived directly circle are managed using judgement. We do not undertake a 
formal, probabilistic risk assessment before crossing the road; some combination of instinct, intuition 
and experience usually sees us safely to the other side. The consequences of failing to carry the one, 
or convert pounds to Newtons are, like road accidents, usually the result of carelessness: a failure pay 
attention to directly perceptible hazards. 
The second, the risk-perceived-through-science circle, dominates the risk management 
literature. This is the circle within which most of the risk professionals ply their trade. It is the 
mathematical circle. In this circle we find books, reports and articles with verifiable numbers, cause-
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and-effect reasoning, probability and inference. This is the domain of, amongst others, biologists 
with microscopes searching for microbial pathogens and astronomers with telescopes plotting the 
courses of incoming asteroids. This circle contains contributions from the whole range of science, 
technology and the social sciences – from physics and chemistry to epidemiology and criminology. 
But the central science is statistics – the discipline that has probability at its core. The future can be 
imagined with the help of statisticians, but only if one is happy to assume that the historic 
relationships embodied in their models will persist unchanged into an uncertain future. 
The circle labelled virtual risk contains contested hypotheses, ignorance, uncertainty and 
unknown unknowns. If an issue cannot be settled by science and numbers, we rely, as with directly 
perceptible risks, on judgement. Some find this enormously liberating; interested parties are freed to 
argue from their beliefs, prejudices or superstitions. It is in this circle that we find the longest-
running and most acrimonious arguments. Virtual risks may or may not be real, but beliefs about 
them have real consequences. Global warming has been placed in this circle because the (potentially 
catastrophic?) warming of which some warn, and which others dispute, is the product of models that 
grossly simplify extremely complex systems, but lead some to propose policies that would, if 
pursued, dramatically alter the life-styles of billions. 
 
Risk on the Road: Numbers, and Arguments about Numbers 
We can find all three of these risk types contending on the road. In order to contain the 
discussion in this essay within reasonable bounds I will focus mainly on examples from the realm of 
road safety. Road safety is an issue that comes with a large number of numbers attached. And they 
settle few arguments. 
People living alongside roads with high volumes of fast traffic often complain, relying on 
their direct perceptions, that their roads are dangerous, and campaign for measures that will reduce 
the volume and slow the speed of the traffic outside their front doors. Their campaigns sometimes 
bring them into contact with the highway engineers responsible for their roads. The engineers are 
likely to confront them with numbers from the mathematical circle of Figure 1. Their road accident 
hot-spot maps show that the roads complained of are safe, with no, or very few, accidents. But the 
people living alongside the road are unpersuaded by the numbers on the engineers’ maps. They can 
see that their roads are dangerous. 
The road environment also throws up numerous problems that can be consigned to the 
“virtual” circle of Figure 1 – issues about which people cannot agree or confess ignorance. At what 
age is it safe to allow your children to get to school on their own, or cross a busy road? How will 
driverless cars interact with pedestrians and cyclists? Should cyclists be compelled to wear helmets, 
or motorists seat belts1? All these are current on-going debates that spring to mind.  
Crossing the road  
I offer Figure 2 as a simple model of what goes on in my head when I am crossing the road. I 
call it the risk thermostat. The thermostat is set in the top left-hand corner. The setting of risk 
thermostats can vary enormously – from that of a timid and cautious little old lady named Prudence 
to that of a wild and reckless Hell’s Angel. But everyone has some propensity to take risks; a zero 
risk life is not possible. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Readers who thought that this debate had been settled are referred to “Britain’s seat belt law should be 
repealed” (http://john-adams.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2008/08/seat-belts-for-significance-2.pdf). It is a 
debate that goes back to 1982 (see, for example, http://john-adams.co.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2006/SAE%20seatbelts.pdf) and more recently (see, for example, http://www.john-
adams.co.uk/?s=seat+belts) 
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A propensity to take risks leads to risk taking behaviour that leads, by definition, to accidents. 
To take a risk is to do something that carries with it a probability of an adverse outcome. Through 
having accidents, and surviving them and learning from them, or seeing them on television, or being 
warned long ago by mother, I have acquired a perception of the risks associated with crossing roads. 
The model proposes that when my perception of a risk and my propensity to take it are out of 
balance I change my behaviour to restore the balance. Why do I cross the road? To get to the reward 
on other side; and the magnitude of that reward will influence the setting of my thermostat. The 
change in behaviour in response to changes in the perception of risks described by Figure 2 is 
commonly known as risk compensation. 
 
Figure 2. The risk thermostat 
I used to describe the process illustrated by Figure 2 as cost-benefit analysis without the £ or 
$ signs, but nothing, it appears, is beyond the determined economist’s ability to be rendered as a sum 
of money. Spending on drugs and other medical procedures is commonly justified in terms of the 
Qalys (quality adjusted life years) that they would yield – the UK value of a Qaly currently ranges 
from £10,000 to £70,000 (Donaldson et al., 2011). A significant benefit claimed for new road 
schemes in Britain is the value of the lives that they would save – with each life currently valued at  
£1,249,890 (2006 value, routinely adjusted for inflation: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100304070241/http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/economics/software/c
oba11usermanual/part2thevalofcostsandb3154.pdf). And the Stern Report, an influential contribution to 
the climate change debate in Britain has sparked a debate framed in terms of the monetary costs and 
benefits, and their discount rates, likely to be incurred or enjoyed many generations into the future 
(see, for example, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stern_Review#The_costs_of_mitigation). 
 
What kills you matters 
But it appears that in the eyes of many non-economists, some pounds or dollars are more 
equal than others. In listing some of the contents of the Rewards and Accidents boxes in Figure 2 
control and loss of control have been highlighted. Figure 3 sets out the significance of this factor. 
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Figure 3. What kills you matters 
Acceptance of a given actuarial level of risk varies widely with the perceived level of control 
an individual can exercise over it and, in the case of imposed risks, with the perceived motives of the 
imposer. 
With ‘pure’ voluntary risks, the risk itself, with its associated challenge and rush of 
adrenaline, is the reward. Most climbers on Mount Everest and K2 know that it is dangerous and 
willingly take the risk. Similarly thrill-seeking young men driving recklessly are aware that what 
they are doing is dangerous; that is the point. 
With a voluntary, self-controlled, applied risk, such as driving, the reward is getting 
expeditiously from A to B. But the sense of control that drivers have over their fates appears to 
encourage a high level of tolerance of the risks involved. 
Cycling from A to B (I write as a London cyclist) is done with a diminished sense of control 
over one’s fate. This sense is supported by statistics that show that per kilometre travelled a cyclist is 
much more likely to die than someone in a car. This is a good example of the importance of 
distinguishing between relative and absolute risk. Although much greater, the absolute risk of 
cycling is still small – 1 fatality in 25 million kilometres cycled; not even Lance Armstrong can 
begin to cover that distance in a lifetime of cycling. And numerous studies have demonstrated that 
the extra relative risk is more than offset by the health benefits of regular cycling; regular cyclists 
live longer. 
While people may voluntarily board planes, buses and trains, the popular reaction to crashes 
in which passengers are passive victims, suggests that the public demand a higher standard of safety 
in circumstances in which people voluntarily hand over control of their safety to pilots, or bus or 
train drivers. 
Risks imposed by nature – such as those endured by people living on the San Andreas Fault 
or the slopes of Mount Etna – or by impersonal economic forces – such as the vicissitudes of the 
global economy – are placed in the middle of the scale. Reactions vary widely. Such risks are usually 
seen as motiveless and are responded to fatalistically – unless or until the risk can be connected to 
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base human motives. The damage caused by Hurricane Katrina to New Orleans is now attributed 
more to wilful bureaucratic neglect than to nature. And the search for the causes of the economic 
devastation attributed to the ‘credit crunch’ is now focusing on the enormous bonuses paid to the 
bankers who profited from the subprime debacle.  
Risks imposed by one’s fellow humans are less tolerated. Consider mobile phones. The risk 
associated with the handsets is either non-existent or very small. The risk associated with the base 
stations, measured by radiation dose, unless one is up the mast with an ear to the transmitter, is 
orders of magnitude less. Yet all around the world billions of people are queuing up to take the 
voluntary risk, and almost all the opposition is focused on the base stations, which are seen by 
objectors as impositions. Because the radiation dose received from the handset increases with 
distance from the base station, to the extent that campaigns against the base stations are successful, 
they will increase the distance from the base station to the average handset, and thus the radiation 
dose. The base station risk, if it exists, might be labelled a benignly imposed risk; no one supposes 
that the phone company wishes to harm all those in the neighbourhood. And the extent to which 
traffic is seen as an imposed risk varies widely; parents of young children and cyclists are much 
more likely to feel it as an imposition than drivers of SUVs and big cars. 
Even less tolerated are risks whose imposers are perceived to be motivated by profit or greed. 
In Europe, big biotech companies such as Monsanto are routinely denounced by environmentalist 
opponents for being more concerned with profit than the welfare of the environment or the 
consumers of its products. Manufacturers of high-performance cars are assigned by some road-safety 
campaigners to the same category, their arguments sometimes adding damage to the environment to 
the danger posed to vulnerable road users. 
Less tolerated still are malignly imposed risks – crimes ranging from mugging to rape and 
murder. In most countries the number of deaths on the road far exceeds the numbers of murders, but 
far more people are sent to jail for murder than for causing death by dangerous driving. In the United 
States in 2012 14,827 people were murdered – a statistic that evoked far more popular concern than 
the 33,561 killed on the road – but far less concern than that inspired by the zero killed by terrorists.  
Which brings us to Al Qaida, Isis and their associates. How do we account for the massive 
scale, world-wide, of the outpourings of grief and anger attaching to its victims, whose numbers are 
dwarfed by victims of other causes of violent death? In London 52 people were killed by terrorist 
bombs on 7 July 2005, about six days worth of death on the road in the whole country. But thousands 
of people do not gather in London’s Trafalgar Square every Sunday to mark, with a three-minute 
silence, their grief for the previous week’s road accident victims. 
The dangers that can be tracked to the malign intent of terrorists are amplified by 
governments who see them as a threat to their ability to govern – to their ability to control events. To 
justify forms of surveillance and restrictions on liberty previously associated with tyrannies, 
‘democratic’ governments now characterize any risk to life posed by terrorists as a threat to Our Way 
of Life. 
Moving from the top to bottom of Figure 3 we encounter a phenomenon known as risk 
amplification. The numbers almost don’t matter. Figures 2 and 3 can also help to explain the 
discrepancy referred to above between the judgments of local residents and the mathematically based 
judgement of the highway engineer about the safety of a road. If the residents perceive their road to 
be dangerous they will modify their behaviour. Old people will be afraid to cross it. Children will be 
forbidden to cross it. And fit adults will cross it quickly and carefully. Their good accident record is 
often purchased at the cost of community severance. People on one side of the road tend no longer to 
know their neighbours on the other side. The numbers on the highway engineer’s accident map 
measure not safety, but risk aversion. And those living on the road will tend to see the danger as an 
imposed risk, amplifying their perception of the risk. 
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Some more numbers from Great Britain 
Staying with risk on the road, Figure 4 describes the rise and fall of road accident deaths in 
Great Britain between 1950 and 2012. I use Great Britain as an example because it is the country 
with which I am most familiar, but most highly motorised countries display similar patterns over this 
period. GB road accident fatalities reached a post-war peak of 7985 in 1966 before falling to 1713 in 
2013 – the lowest since records began. 
 
Figure 4. Road accident deaths: Great Britain (1950-2012) 
How might the numbers represented by this graph be explained? Over the period traffic grew 
considerably; cars improved in terms of crash protection and better brakes; numerous laws were 
passed to curb speed, compel the use of seat belts and helmets, and ban drinking and driving and the 
use of mobile phones. And highway engineers lengthened sight-lines, installed central barriers on 
freeways and pedestrian barriers in cities, and removed roadside obstacles such as trees.  
So, was it the engineers with their improved brakes and crash protection? Was it the road 
builders with their safer roads? Was it the legislators and legislation enforcers? Who deserves the 
credit for this extraordinary reduction in road accident fatalities? 
Figure 4 transforms Figure 3 in a way that sheds some light on the possible risk reduction 
effect of all these measures. It represents fatalities per unit of exposure – i.e. per billion vehicle 
kilometres of traffic. It shows a 96% decrease over the 62-year period displayed on the graph, 
 
Figure 5. Road accident deaths per billion vehicle kilometers : Great Britain (1950-2012) 
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And Figure 5, with the vertical axis logged, transforms the graph again in a way that poses 
challenging questions to those who would claim credit for any of the risk reduction measures listed 
above. 
 
Figure 6. Log road accident deaths per billion vehicle kilometres: Great Britain (1950-2012) 
The slope of the straight line indicates that, over this period, fatalities per kilometre fell by an 
average of 5.3% per year. Over most of the period before 1966 traffic increased faster that 5.3% per 
year and afterwards more slowly with the result that over the whole of the period fatalities per 
kilometre declined.  
But it is extraordinarily difficult to spot the contributions of the vehicle engineers and 
manufacturers, the legislators and the road builders referred to above. Over this period the 
interventions whose promoters promised would have the largest and most immediate effects were the 
energy crisis speed limits and, in 1983, the seat belt law and the introduction, in the same year, of 
evidential breath-testing. Both promised instant large downward steps on the graph in Figures 5 and 
6 and both are very difficult to see.  The largest single step down over the whole period was in 1991 
when nothing significant happened on the road safety front – except for the most severe economic 
recession since the war. 
In Britain, over this period, the largest road safety claims, by a wide margin, have been made 
by the seat-belt campaigners. In 2008, the 25th anniversary of the seat-belt law, the Department for 
Transport, the Parliamentary Advisory Council on Transport Safety and the Royal Society for the 
Prevention of Accidents all published press releases claiming credit for their contribution to the 
creation of a law that had saved 60,000 lives over the previous 25 years.  
Here we have an opportunity for mathematicians 
The claims are outrageous nonsense. British mathematical enthusiasts were asleep at the 
switch. The downward arrow on Figure 6 illustrates the magnitude of the sharp downward step that 
should have occurred on the graph if the claims (averaging 2400 lives a year over 25 years) were 
true.  
Legislators and engineers have, for many years, routinely over-claimed for their safety 
achievements (Adams, 1985). The problem is not confined to the road safety arena. Figure 7 by 
Leeth and Hale (2013) in their examination of the effect of the Occupational Safety and Health Act 
of 1970 suggests little has changed over the intervening decades. On their graph, displaying a 
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downward trend similar to that in Figure 6, it is very difficult to discern the much-heralded effects of 
the Act. 
 
Figure 7. An evaluation OSHA's effectiveness 
[Reproduced with the kind permission of the authors] 
Almost 35 years ago Laurence Ross (1976), in the Scandinavian Myth, used a similar line-on-
a-graph method to challenge the widely proclaimed view that Sweden, with its low permitted alcohol 
levels, strict enforcement, and draconian punishments was a model for the rest of the world to 
follow. His interrupted time-series analyses revealed no effect of the Scandinavian drink-drive laws 
on the relevant accident statistics. 
His analysis suggested that tough drink-drive legislation is only likely to work where it 
accords with prevailing public opinion. He noted the existence of a politically powerful temperance 
tradition in Scandinavia. Many people considered drinking and driving a serious offence (if not a sin) 
before it was officially designated as such by legislators. The absence of a detectable effect of 
Scandinavian drink-drive laws on accident and fatality statistics at the time the laws came into effect 
suggested, according to Ross, that the laws were symptomatic of a widespread concern about the 
problem, and that most people likely to obey such laws were already obeying them before they were 
passed. The laws, in effect, simply ratified established public opinion. 
I offer an examination of safety claims as a challenge to mathematical enthusiasts 
everywhere. It is a game the whole class can play. And it can be more than a game. It can be an 
introduction to the fascinating world of risk. There are vast numbers of risk management proposals 
and claims begging to be tested by mathematical enthusiasts. The risk-management “starter list” 
presented at the beginning of this essay merely scratches the surface.  
In conclusion I return to risk on the road and invite others to share my fascination with the 
problems it presents. This is where I began over 40 years ago when challenging the Government’s 
road safety arguments at public inquiries and I still find some of the questions it raises challenging. 
 
A final set of numbers – and a hypothesis 
How might we account for the dramatic fall in numbers of` those killed on the road as traffic 
increased since the Second World War in economically developed countries such as Britain? I offer 
Figure 8 as a basis for a hypothesis. 
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Figure 8. Development and road accident fatalities 
The Central African Republic at the top of the top of the graph has a fatality rate per vehicle 
more than 3000 times higher than Norway at the bottom. And yet it has, along with most of the other 
countries at the top end, a full set of road safety laws: national speed limits, drink-drive limits, 
helmet laws, seat belt laws, child restraint laws and laws forbidding the use of mobile phones while 
driving. And they are all achieving their extraordinary kill rates per vehicle with modern imported 
vehicles with a hundred years of safety technology built into them. Norway’s superior roads also 
appear unlikely to contribute to the difference; it is often remarked that potholes are nature’s speed 
humps. 
It appears that the process of “development” is accompanied by increased risk aversion and a 
growing sense of collective responsibility. A strong correlation exists between a country’s score on 
the Equality Adjusted Human Development Index and its road death rate per vehicle. Created by 
Mahbub-ul-Haq and Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen, the Inequality-Adjusted Human Development 
index is a composite of average longevity, education and income, adjusted for inequality 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_Development_Index). The largest outliers have been identified as a 
spur to further research. 
For people living through the period represented by Figures 5 and 6 it would be difficult to 
perceive their roads getting 5.3% safer year on year. But that 62-year period has witnessed 
extraordinary societal change, and not just in the workplace as noted in Figure 7. As a child I can 
remember my respectable parents urging “one for the road” on departing guests. Now drunken 
driving has become a stigmatizing offence.  
Over this period the freedom of children has been severely constrained. I grew up as a free-
range child at liberty to roam the neighbourhood until the streetlights came on and expected to get to 
school on my own. A study of English schools in 1971 revealed that 80% of 7 and 8 year old 
children got to school on their own, unaccompanied by an adult. A follow-up study of the same 
schools in 1990 revealed that that number had fallen to 9% - and the main reason parents gave for 
denying their children the freedom that they had enjoyed as children was fear of traffic (Hillman, 
Adams & Whitelegg, 1990). And now it has become a legal child-protection issue. In England two 
controversies recently appeared in the press in which parents were threatened with child protection 
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orders for allowing their children what used to be the widely accepted freedom to get to school 
unaccompanied (Moore & Maxted, 2010;  BBC News, 2010). 
 
Figure 9. Risk management: where are the keys? 
Figure 9 is a redrawn version of the Venn diagram of Figure 1, revised in homage to the 
mythical drunk who lost his keys in the dark and searched for them under the lamppost because that 
was where there was light to see. Risk managers searching for the keys to their problems amidst the 
brightly lit numbers in the mathematical circle are likely to be equally disappointed. 
My wife and I usually buy a Euro Lottery ticket every week. The chance of winning is one in 
116,531,800. My statistically minded friends jeer at me. My question to them is where else can we 
buy a week’s worth of so much fantasy for £2?  We spend an enjoyable week being wonderfully 
charitable to worthy causes and generous to friends and family – and enjoying a bit of self-
indulgence. Our fantasies are highly improbable – but not impossible2. 
Even when risks can be calculated with great numerical precision the numbers can only be 
used to inform judgment, not substitute for it.  And it matters greatly who is making the judgment. 
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